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IMPEACHMENT DEFANGED AND OTHER INSTITUTIONAL 
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE CLINTON SCANDALS 
MICHAEL j. GERHARDT* 
INTRODUCTION 
It would be an understatement to say that over the past year we 
have heard a lot about "Clinton fatigue" and the scandals of the Clin-
ton presidency. So, it is fitting that one important purpose of this 
Symposium is to explore the ramifications of the so-called Clinton 
scandals for the person whose inauguration as president the nation 
will celebrate in January 2001_1 
I refer to the scandals of the Clinton presidency as "so-called" 
because one could suggest, as some political scientists have, that a sig-
nificant portion of the rhetoric about the scandal-ridden Clinton 
presidency is hyperbole designed primarily for the purpose of tainting 
the political opposition.2 It is not inconceivable that much of the 
rhetoric during the 2000 presidential election about the criminality of 
both Bill Clinton and his Vice President was designed to make the 
electorate think that there must have been more than a little fire-or 
perhaps a raging conflagration-of corruption to explain all the 
smoke allegedly coming from the Clinton administration. In this Arti-
cle, I will not question the veracity of such rhetoric. Instead, I will 
assume the rhetoric's veracity for the sake of clarifYing the institu-
tional effects of the congressional and legal actions taken in response 
to it. Of particular concern to me are the ramifications of the most 
dramatic response to President Clinton's misconduct-the impeach-
ment proceedings brought against him in 1998-99. My purpose in 
* Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. B.A., Yale University; M.Sc., London 
School of Economics; J.D., University of Chicago. I am grateful to Terry Eaton, Class of 
2002 at Duke Law School, and Jason Sayers, Class of 2002 at William & Mary Law School, 
for their very helpful research assistance; and to the editors of the Maryland Law Review for 
their patience and support in completing this Article. 
1. Eds.-The final edit on this Article was completed on November 18, 2000, when 
the election remained "too close to call." 
2. See, e.g., Paul J. Quirk, Scandal Time: The Clinton Impeachment and the Distraction of 
American Politics, in THE CLINTON SCANDAL AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN GoVERNMENT 119, 
131 (Mark]. Rozell & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2000) (arguing that "[v]ery conservative Republi-
can members of Congress ... with highly ideological core constituencies ... have little or 
no concern about maintaining mutual trust with Clinton," and that "[i]f a possible scandal 
seems to provide even a remote opportunity to punish [him] ... they will seize upon that 
strategy and give it up very reluctantly"). 
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adopting this focus is to clarify the status of the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings as a reflection of (indeed, the culmination of) a phenom-
enon that predated the Clinton presidency. The phenomenon is the 
increasing tendency of politicians (and their allies) to use media reve-
lations, congressional investigations, and judicial proceedings to de-
feat their opposition. This phenomenon will surely challenge the 
next president, as well as other institutions that have had stakes in the 
revelation, investigation, and condemnation of presidential miscon-
duct. Indeed, the controversy over the legitimacy of the outcome of 
the 2000 presidential election will undoubtedly intensif:Y this phenom-
enon for the next president and these institutions, which include the 
Supreme Court, the Congress, the presidency, the media, and even 
my own profession of legal academics. 
Part I of this Article examines the cumulative effect of several Su-
preme Court opinions that have made it harder for a president to 
shield himself from congressional and judicial inquiries into his pri-
vate misconduct. The conventional wisdom is that these decisions 
have weakened the presidency vis-a-vis the other branches. In my 
view, these decisions are harmful to a president to the extent that he 
fights them. I use several historical examples to demonstrate that a 
president who puts his integrity on the line has nothing to fear-and, 
in fact, might have much to gain-from these decisions. 
Part II examines the likely ramifications of Clinton's impeach-
ment and trial for. the impeachment process itself.3 First, I challenge 
the conventional wisdom that the Clinton impeachment proceedings 
might have weakened the presidency. I contend that the proceedings 
are more likely to have strengthened the presidency, because mem-
bers of Congress are unlikely to pursue similar charges against a presi-
dent ever again. Future members of Congress almost certainly will 
grant presidents a much wider zone of immunity for any personal mis-
conduct than did the Republican Congress in 1998-99. Next, I discuss 
whether the Clinton impeachment can help explain whether presi-
dential and judicial impeachments should be conducted under differ-
ent standards. Moreover, I find that the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings likely underscore the ultimate ineffectiveness of im-
3. Impeachment, of course, has two possible meanings. It may refer to the unique 
power of the House of Representatives to impeach certain high-ranking officials, including 
the president. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives ... shall 
have the sole Power of Impeachment."). It may also be used to refer generally to the 
formal process by which the Senate considers the removal of a president. See id. § 3, cl. 6 
("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments .... [A]nd no Person shall 
be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present."). The 
meaning I attribute to the term will depend on the context in which I use it. 
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peachment-thus, the defanging of impeachment-as a response to 
serious presidential misconduct. For a president who does something 
truly and almost universally regarded as a legitimately impeachable 
offense, impeachment will no longer be the likely remedy. It is too 
cumbersome and antiquated-particularly in the age of the Internet 
and the twenty-four-hour news cycle, when information, images, innu-
endo, and rumors of scandal spread instantaneously. Once informed 
about a severe abuse of power by a president, the American people 
are unlikely to be patient. Just as they were impatient to have the 
impeachment proceedings against President Clinton end quickly be-
cause they believed he had not done anything that justified his re-
moval from office, the American people are likely to be equally 
impatient with a chief executive's refusal to fall on his sword once he 
has done something that most people view as beyond the pale. A pres-
ident's loss of substantial support from the public and congressional 
leaders is likely to produce inescapable pressure for him to resign. 
Precisely such a dynamic led to Richard Nixon's resignation. 
Part III examines four other possible alternatives to impeachment 
for presidential misconduct. First, I consider the feasibility of prose-
cuting a sitting president and conclude that there may be practical, 
but not constitutional, reasons foreclosing it. Second, I discuss the 
feasibility of censure in the aftermath of the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings. I suggest that the Clinton proceedings have not fore-
closed the possibility of censure in a future case, particularly because 
such action is consistent with constitutional text, structure, and prac-
tice. Third, I argue that the electoral process may be an alternative to 
impeachment since the outcome of the 2000 presidential election 
may be treated as vindication by one side or the other in the Clinton 
impeachment proceedings. Finally, I explore the costs-to democ-
racy, the legislative process, and innocent persons-resulting from the 
increased use of media revelations, congressional inquiries, and judi-
cial proceedings to impede political foes. I encourage the next presi-
dent to take the lead in denouncing this trend, while members of 
Congress should agree, at the very least, to have bipartisan support 
before authorizing congressional subpoenas or investigations. 
Part IV critiques the media's coverage of the Clinton scandals. I 
criticize both the media's disturbing penchant for using scandal or 
drama to build or maintain high ratings, and the related practice of 
promoting conflicts and featuring speculation or commentary at least 
as much as the conventional reporting of facts. One possible solution 
to this problem is for each news organization to declare publicly its 
standards for publication or to broadcast and demonstrate its compli-
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ance with such standards. Major news organizations can also keep 
each other honest by covering the abilities of competing news organi-
zations to fulfill their respective standards of publication or 
broadcasting. 
Finally, Part Vaddresses a disturbing trend in academic commen-
tary that has been exacerbated by the Clinton impeachment proceed-
ings. The impeachment hearings provided unprecedented 
opportunities for law professors to gain notoriety as public intellectu-
als. But, in these roles, many law professors indulged the media's 
penchant for scandal, speculation, and conflict. In the absence of any 
norms within legal academia to guide or constrain such commentary 
in the media, many academicians acted more as advocates than as dis-
passionate commentators; some of them used the hearings as their 
first or primary opportunity to opine on the federal impeachment 
process and (not coincidentally) gained notoriety in the process. 
Through such commentary, many law professors helped to weaken 
the credibility of their enterprise (as a nonpartisan venture) and 
coarsen, rather than elevate, constitutional discourse. In the future, 
the challenge for law professors will be to internalize standards of 
public conduct and discourse. To encourage such internalization, I 
suggest that law faculties adopt shaming penalties to discourage self-
promotion and bush-league commentary. In addition, I encourage 
law reviews and other publishers of legal commentary to exercise 
greater checks on the quality and tone of academic discourse. 
I. THE CLINTON SCANDALS AND THE FEDERAL CouRTS 
The conventional wisdom is that in a series of decisions on the 
special privileges and immunities available to presidents, the federal 
courts have weakened the institution of the presidency. 4 First, in 
United States v. Nixon, 5 the Supreme Court held that a president is not 
entitled to an absolute executive privilege to withhold information 
that he unilaterally prefers to keep confidential from the other 
4. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Unimperial Presidency, NEw REPusuc, Mar. 8, 1999, at 
25, 25 (arguing that "the legal precedents sprouting from the Clinton scandals have done 
considerable damage to the presidency, leaving us with an office weaker in key respects 
than the one that the Founders envisioned"); Adam Clymer, The Presidency Is Still There, Not 
Quite the Same, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1999, § 4, at 1 (discussing the recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court and concluding that "the Presidency is a weaker office today than it was on 
Jan. 20, 1993, when Mr. Clinton first assumed it"); see also infra notes 5-21 and accompany-
ing text (discussing pre-Clinton decisions of the Court that arguably weakened the 
presidency). 
5. 418 u.s. 683 (1974). 
2001] INSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE CUNTON SCANDALS 63 
branches.6 Instead, the Court upheld a qualified executive privilege 
that required the federal courts to balance a president's need to main-
tain the confidentiality of certain communications or information 
against the needs or interests of the persons or institutions demand-
ing disclosure. 7 The more specific and compelling a president's need 
to maintain confidentiality (such as to protect the lives of service peo-
ple in combat), the more likely are his chances of being able to do so. 
Second, the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson8 upheld, with 
only a single dissent,9 the constitutionality of the Independent Coun-
sel Act. 10 The case did not involve an independent counsel's investi-
gation of the president personally (and thus an independent 
counsel's direct interference with presidential activities).U Neverthe-
less, the Court held, inter alia, that the Act barred a president from 
removing at will an independent counsel, and that such a restriction 
was consistent with the separation of powers because it did not "un-
duly interfer[e]"12 with a president's basic ability to discharge his 
unique constitutional functions. 13 
Third, the Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald} 4 upheld, 5-4, a president's 
absolute protection from damages liability for his official acts as chief 
executive.15 The majority based its decision upon "a functionally 
mandated incident of the President's unique office, rooted in the con-
stitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our 
6. ld. at 713 ("[W]hen the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials 
sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, 
it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair adminis-
tration of criminal justice."). 
7. Id. ("Upon receiving a claim of privilege from the Chief Executive, it [is the] duty 
of the District Court to treat the subpoenaed material as presumptively privileged and to 
require the Special Prosecutor to demonstrate that the Presidential material was 'essential 
to the justice of the [pending criminal] case.'" (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 
187, 192 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694))). 
8. 487 u.s. 654 (1988). 
9. Many regard Justice Scalia's dissent as one of the most prescient dissents ever filed. 
Justice Scalia criticized the majority for "fail[ing] to explain why it is not true that-as the 
text of the Constitution seems to require, as the Founders seemed to expect, and as our 
past cases have uniformly assumed-all purely executive power must be under the control 
of the President." Id. at 733-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
10. Marrison, 487 U.S. at 69&-97. The independent counsel statute was first created 
under the Ethics in Govemment Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994)). 
11. The parties investigated were employees of the Department of Justice. Marrison, 
487 U.S. at 665-66. 
12. Id. at 693. 
13. ld. at 693-96. 
14. 457 u.s. 731 (1982). 
15. Id. at 757-58. 
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history." 16 The Court cited many factors that weighed in favor of up-
holding this absolute immunity: the viability and influence of the pres-
idency, which makes its occupant an easy and tempting target for civil 
lawsuits;17 the importance of protecting a president's judgment and 
energy from the distractions and pressure that potential damages lia-
bility would create;18 and the availability of alternative checks on presi-
dential activity, such as media scrutiny, congressional oversight, and 
the possibility of impeachment. 19 Given the diverse and open-ended 
nature of presidential duties, the majority added, the president's abso-
lute immunity cannot workably be limited to specific functions of his 
office, but instead must extend to all "acts within the 'outer perime-
ter' of his official responsibility."20 
The Court in Nixon reserved the question of whether a sitting 
president may be subject to civil lawsuits for his unofficial actions. 21 
In 1997, however, the Court answered this question with a resounding 
''Yes." In Clinton v. jones,22 the Court unanimously rejected any presi-
dential immunity from civil actions that are based on the president's 
unofficial conduct. 23 Mter the jones decision, the specter arose that it, 
coupled with Morrison and Nixon, potentially placed the president in a 
vulnerable position when dealing with an independent counsel inves-
tigating him for allegedly unofficial or pre-presidential misconduct. 
The concerns about a president's vulnerability to distraction (or 
worse) as a result of civil damage actions based on his unofficial con-
duct only intensified after two more federal court decisions in 1998. 
In In reSealed Case,24 the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit rejected the existence of any special "protec-
tive function privilege" that would have precluded Secret Service 
agents from being compelled to testify about possible presidential mis-
conduct observed while performing their protective function in physi-
16. Id. at 749. 
17. /d. at 751-53. 
18. /d. at 753-54. 
19. ld. at 755-57. 
20. Id. at 756. 
21. Id. at 748 n.27 ("[O]ur holding today need only be that the President is absolutely 
immune from civil damages liability for his official acts in the absence of explicit affirma-
tive action by Congress. We decide only this constitutional issue, which is necessary to 
disposition of the case before us."). 
22. 520 u.s. 681 (1997). 
23. Id. at 705-06 ("We ... hold that the doctrine of separation of powers does not 
require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves 
office."). 
24. 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 
2001] INSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE CLINTON SCANDALS 65 
cal proximity to the president. 25 In In re Lindsey, 26 another panel from 
the D.C. Circuit held that the Deputy White House Counsel, when 
called before a federal grand jury, could not refuse, on the basis of a 
government attorney-client privilege, to answer questions about a 
president's criminal misconduct, even if information about the mis-
conduct was obtained in private communications with the president.27 
To the extent that these decisions weakened the presidency vis-a-
vis the other branches, conventional wisdom places the blame 
squarely on Bill Clinton. First, his failure to settle the Jones lawsuit 
allowed it to fester until it became a danger to him (and his presi-
dency). Second, Clinton did not have to lie under oath about his rela-
tionship with Monica Lewinsky when he faced intense questioning 
about it in a deposition in the Jones case. If Clinton had told the truth, 
it is conceivable that he might have spared himself and the nation a 
great deal of grief (not to mention costly impeachment proceed-
ings).28 Third, Clinton's zeal to protect himself led him, in the view of 
many supporters of his impeachment and removal, to authorize sev-
eral frivolous challenges to lawful inquiries from the Office of Inde-
pendent Counsel. 29 These challenges arguably weakened the 
presidency. Clinton's conduct in the Jones case also led to an unprece-
dented disbarment proceeding against a sitting president30 and a fine 
imposed by a federal district court for lying under oath. 31 If Clinton 
were to have come clean sooner, or were he not to have blocked the 
testimony of his aides and Secret Service agents (he could, for exam-
ple, have voluntarily waived any applicable privilege), he could have 
25. Id. at 1079. 
26. 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 
27. Id. at 1278. 
28. See Quirk, supra note 2, at 123 (recognizing the argument that "[b]y the simple 
expedient of admitting the truth himself in the Jones deposition or at least after the Tripp 
tapes were revealed, Clinton could have prevented most of the disruption of the Lewinsky 
inquiry"). In the seven months between President Clinton's civil deposition in the Jones 
case and his grand jury appearance, he had been wamed repeatedly to come clean. Conse-
quently, it is only fair that he be held responsible for most of the fallout from his failure to 
heed this counsel. 
29. See, e.g., In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1278 (holding that an attomey in the Office of 
the President could not assert govemment attomey-client privilege to withhold from a 
grand jury information that related to possible criminal conduct); In re Sealed Case, 148 
F.3d at 1079 (refusing to recognize a "protective function privilege" for Secret Service 
agents who, in response to a request from the OIC, attempted to withhold information 
conceming Clinton's relationship with Monica Lewinsky). 
30. See Don Van Natta Jr., Panel Advises That Clinton Be Disbarred: President Vows to Fight 
Penalty by Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2000, at Al. 
31. See Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1134 (E.D. Ark. 1999) ("The President 
shall pay plaintiff any reasonable expenses, including attomey's fees, caused by his willful 
failure to obey this Court's discovery Orders."). 
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preserved the opportunity for future presidents to have greater lever-
age in cutting deals with members of Congress or special prosecutors 
bent on questioning White House personnel about presidential 
misconduct. 
The conventional wisdom about the likely consequences of the 
federal court decisions on executive privilege and immunity is over-
stated, however, for several reasons. First, it overlooks how most presi-
dents protected themselves from intrusive questioning by the other 
branches prior to the Nixon decision (and, in many instances, after it). 
Most presidents traditionally protected themselves by bargaining with 
the members of Congress or the lawyers who were making the inquir-
ies.32 To be sure, recent court decisions provide those seeking infor-
mation from a president with some leverage that they did not have 
before the 1970s-by backing up any threats to go to court with the 
likelihood of victory.33 Nevertheless, court battles take time, and, in 
future bargaining sessions, presidents can take advantage of the pros-
pect of protracted litigation. 
Second, presidents can learn from the example of Calvin Cool-
idge that there are political and personal benefits to putting their in-
tegrity on the line when faced with charges of scandal. After 
succeeding to the presidency upon the death of Warren G. Harding, 
Coolidge inherited an administration riddled with rumors of scan-
dat.34 The rumors concerned leasing privileges to the government's 
Teapot Dome oil reserve in Wyoming and Elk Hills oil reserve in Cali-
fornia.35 Coolidge seized the initiative. He nominated two special 
prosecutors, whom he asked the Senate to confirm. 36 He charged the 
prosecutors to handle all litigation associated with the scandal.37 His 
timing was impeccable, for the Senate was on the verge of taking more 
32. See, e.g., Katy J. Harriger, Independent Justice: The Federal Special Prosecutor in 
American Politics 13-39 (1992) (reviewing how presidents responded to investigations by 
special prosecutors prior to the passage of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978); 
Jonathan Turley, Paradise Lost: The Clinton Administration and the Erosion of Executive Privilege, 
60 Mo. L. REv. 205, 224 (2001) (explaining that "past White House counsels have long 
preferred to leave questions of privilege unresolved and to operate within the ambiguity of 
executive privilege to negotiate compromises with Congress or the judiciary"). 
33. See supra notes 4-27 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases that have lim-
ited the special privileges and immunities available to presidents). 
34. Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent OJunsel: A Vzew from Inside, 86 GEO. LJ. 2307, 
2314 (1998). 
35. /d. at 2315. 
36. /d. 
37. /d. 
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extreme action.38 His appointees, Owen Roberts (a Republican, 
whom Herbert Hoover subsequently appointed to the Supreme 
Court) and Atlee Pomerene (a former senator from Ohio), were per-
fect because they had the professional expertise necessary to conduct 
an investigation that was neither a whitewash nor a flurry of vindictive-
ness. 39 Indeed, the investigation proved to be exemplary. Because of 
their work, Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall was convicted for tak-
ing bribes and became the first cabinet member sent to prison for 
misconduct in office;40 the oil magnate Harry Sinclair was found guilty 
of contempt of court;41 and Attorney General Harry Daugherty was 
eventually fired and later indicted and convicted.42 The investigations 
further revealed that Democrats as well as Republicans had been in-
volved in the scandal.43 But Coolidge was never touched by the inves-
tigations. He rose above them, appeared to be courageous in 
welcoming them, and was handily reelected as president in 1924.44 
Today, it appears more difficult for a president to do what Cool-
idge did, in part because his enemies will have greater access to the 
media to make charges of or insinuations about his guilt. Even so, a 
president has access to the same media, and his access to the bully 
pulpit allows him unique opportunities to put such outlandish 
charges to shame. 
Moreover, running from, rather than standing tall in the face of, 
charges of misconduct (even to protect one's own hide) is counter-
productive. The system that preceded the ill-fated independent coun-
sel law provided a strong disincentive for a president to attack or ob-
struct a special prosecutor. In the previous system, the special 
prosecutor would have been appointed by the president's own attor-
38. See id. (obse!Ving that prior to President Coolidge's proposal, "the hearings had a 
decidedly partisan tone," and that "the Democrats were pushing forward to expose and 
embarrass the Republicans"). 
39. See HARRIGER, supra note 32, at 14 (noting that Roberts and Pomerene "had regular 
contact with the White House, the Senate committee investigating the scandal, [and] the 
Department of Justice, ... [and] in most cases these relationships were congenial and 
characterized by cooperation"). 
40. Smaltz, supra note 34, at 2316. 
41. RoBERT K MuRRAY, THE HARDING ERA: WARREN G. HARDING AND His ADMINISTRA-
TION 472 (1969). Sinclair was found guilty for contempt of court for tampering with the 
jury that initially acquitted him in a criminal matter related to the scandal. !d. 
42. Smaltz, supra note 34, at 2316. 
43. See id. at 2315 (explaining that one individual who confessed to being involved in 
the scandal "admitted giving gratuities to several Democrats, including Warren William G. 
McAdoo, who was then considered the frontrunner for the Democratic Presidential 
nomination"). 
44. See MURRAY, supra note 41, at 511 ("Of the 28,647,000 votes cast, Coolidge received 
15,275,000 or 54 percent in a three-way race, a phenomenal showing."). 
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ney general, and thus any attack or obstruction by the president would 
appear to be an admission of guilt. Such was the case when President 
Nixon fired Archibald Cox-a decision that plainly backfired against 
Nixon. 45 Firing Cox only made Nixon look guilty. The prospect of 
such backfiring has left most other special prosecutors who have been 
appointed by presidents or attorneys general immune to a president's 
public attacks, stonewalling, or retaliation.46 
Also, it is important to recall that the Supreme Court based its 
ruling in the Jones case on the expectation that the district court judge 
would manage discovery to avoid undue interference with the presi-
dent's duties.47 Yet the district judge failed to do so. At a minimum, 
she could have dismissed the case without discovery once she decided 
that Jones had not suffered a sufficiently serious i~ury to support a 
cause of action for sexual harassment.48 She also could have disal-
lowed questioning of the President about Monica Lewinsky, or she 
could have encouraged or orderedJones's lawyers to ask more direct 
questions of the President. 
Too much should not be made out of the seemingly revolution-
ary character of recent federal court rulings on executive privilege 
and immunity. Prior to Jones, the Nixon decision had generally not 
been treated as an odd or especially harmful case in large part be-
cause the Court recognized for the first time that a president was enti-
tled to some executive privilege.49 Moreover, the Court noted in Jones 
that the Supreme Court in Nixon and Chief Justice Marshall in United 
States v. Burf>0 upheld the principle that "the President is subject to 
45. See Smaltz, supra note 34, at 2319 (discussing the public outrage that attended Pres-
ident Nixon's firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox). 
46. Six presidents appointed eleven special prosecutors from 1875 until Archibald 
Cox's appointment in 1973. /d. at 2311. Of these eleven, two were fired. One was fired by 
President Grant in 1875 because the special prosecutor had planned on investigating a 
long-time friend of the President (lending further credence to the commonly-held percep-
tion at that time, and ever after, of widespread corruption in the Grant administration). 
See id. at 2311-12. The second special prosecutor was fired in 1952 by President Truman's 
Attorney General, J. Howard McGrath, because the special prosecutor demanded unlim-
ited access to McGrath's official and personal records. /d. at 2316-17. 
47. See Clinton v.Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707 (1997) ("The high respect that is owed to the 
office of the Chief Executive, though not justifying a rule of categorical immunity, is a 
matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and 
scope of discovery."). 
48. See RicHARD PosNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND 
TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CuNTON 228 (1999) (noting that "the judge [could have] dismissed 
Paula jones's suit ... without requiring the President to submit to being deposed"). 
49. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's treatment of ex-
ecutive privilege in UnitedStatesv. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)). 
50. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). 
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judicial process in appropriate circumstances."51 The Jones Court fur-
ther noted that sitting presidents, including Presidents Monroe, 
Nixon, Ford, and Clinton, "have responded to court orders to provide 
testimony and other information with sufficient frequency that such 
interactions between the Judicial and Executive Branches can scarcely 
be thought a novelty. "52 If there is no normative principle supporting 
a president's use of his office as a shield to block legal process in a 
case challenging his actions as president, then it is hard to see why 
there should be such a principle in a case challenging unofficial con-
duct. 53 The fact that the subject matter of jones involved sex does not 
constitute a justifiable basis for distinguishing it from these other 
precedents or for adopting a special constitutional rule. That fact is 
relevant as a basis for a trial judge to maintain tight control over 
discovery. 
II. IMPEACHMENT PosT-CUNTON 
In this Part, I examine the likely consequences of the Clinton im-
peachment proceedings for impeachment itself. Three possible con-
sequences are especially noteworthy. First, I consider the degree to 
which the Clinton impeachment proceedings will likely strengthen 
the presidency vis-a-vis Congress. Second, I consider the extent to 
which the Clinton impeachment proceedings might help explain 
whether there are (or should be) different standards for impeaching 
presidents and judges. Third, I consider the degree to which the Clin-
51. Jones, 520 U.S. at 703-04; see Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706 ("[N]either the doctrine of 
separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, with-
out more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from 
judicial process under all circumstances."); Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 32-33 (recognizing that a 
subpoena duces tecum could be directed to the president). 
52. Jones, 520 U.S. at 704. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, here referred to 
President Monroe responding to written interrogatories; President Nixon producing tapes, 
as ordered by the Court in Nixon; President Ford being deposed for United States v. Fromme, 
405 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Cal. 1975); and President Clinton testifying on videotape for United 
States v. McDougal, 934 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Ark. 1996). Jones, 520 U.S. at 704-05. 
53. Cf Jones, 520 U.S. at 705 ("lf the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive 
Branch by reviewing the legality of the President's official conduct, and if it may direct 
appropriate process to the President himself, it must follow that the federal courts have 
power to determine the legality of his unofficial conduct."). Ironically, the outcome of the 
Senate impeachment trial parallels the reasoning in the Jones case. The Court decided to 
allow Jones's lawsuit to go forward precisely because it did not directly involve a challenge 
to the President's exercise of his official duties, id. at 692-95, while the Senate acquitted 
Clinton in part because his misconduct lacked a sufficiently public dimension or harm. See 
infra note 57 and accompanying text (citing explanatory statements of some of the sena-
tors who voted to acquit President Clinton). 
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ton proceedings underscore the lack of utility of impeachment in the 
age of the Internet and the twenty-four-hour news cycle. 
A. Bill Clinton's Acquittal as Strengthening the Presidencf4 
One significant issue posed by Bill Clinton's impeachment pro-
ceedings is whether his acquittal will weaken the presidency. During 
the proceedings, there was considerable speculation (mostly by the 
president's defenders) that the impeachment process would harm the 
presidency itself. To the contrary, the outcome of the proceedings is 
likely to make future congresses hesitate before attempting to im-
peach a president for predominately private misconduct of the same 
order or magnitude as committed by Clinton. 
To understand how Congress will likely reach this conclusion one 
needs to consider how the institution itself will construe the signifi-
cance of its acquittal of the President. This is not an insoluble task. It 
is typical for members of Congress to try to legitimize the outcome of 
an impeachment trial (or any legislative process, for that matter) by 
reconciling it with the outcomes of prior proceedings. This reconcili-
ation is likely to work to the advantage of the presidency. 
For example, precedent suggests that Congress will recognize a 
presidential zone of privacy so that a president's private life is largely 
immune to scrutiny in the federal impeachment process. Richard 
Nixon beyond doubt would have been impeached and removed for 
his abuses of uniquely presidential trusts, which had a public dimen-
sion, 55 but not for his income tax fraud, which was purely private.56 
Similarly, most senators who voted to acquit President Clinton ex-
plained that they did not perceive his misconduct as having a suffi-
54. This discussion and the discussion in sections II.B and III .A are taken, in large part, 
from a book review I recendy wrote for the University of Chicago Law Review. Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Perils of Presidential Impeachment, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 293, 300-Q5 (2000). 
55. No member of Congress during the Clinton impeachment proceedings questioned 
the propriety of the impeachment attempt against President Nixon. It has come to stand 
as a paradigm of a legitimate presidential impeachment. See Background and History of Im-
peachment: Hearing Befcrre the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 105th 
Cong. 45 (1998) [hereinafter Hearing on the Background and History of Impeachment] (testi-
mony of Michael J. Gerhardt, Professor of Law, College of William & Mary School of Law) 
(asserting that "[i]n the popular and scholarly mind, Nixon's impeachment represents the 
appropriate use of the impeachment process to address true abuse of power or the use of 
presidential power abusively"). 
56. See Impeachment Inquiry: WiUiam]efferson Clinton, President of the United States, Presenta-
tion on Behalf of the President: Hearing Befcrre the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 05th Con g. 125, 
131-32 (1998) (statements of Robert]. Drinan and Wayne Owen, members of House judi-
ciary Committee during Nixon's impeachment proceedings) (explaining that Nixon's tax 
evasion was not impeachable because it was personal rather than official misconduct). 
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ciently public dimension or injury to warrant removal from office.57 
This decision, coupled with Clinton's acquittal, likely signals that 
there is a zone of the president's private life that will be treated as 
largely off-limits in the federal impeachment process. 
Members of Congress will also likely recognize that any impeach-
ment inquiry into the deeds of a popular president or an inquiry with-
out strong public support must be kept very short. When faced with 
an investigation that might not uncover serious misconduct (insofar as 
the public is concerned) for some time, future members of Congress 
might think twice before beginning such a prolonged investigation for 
fear that it might alienate the public. Consequently, it is possible that 
impeachment will be effective, if at all, only for the kinds of miscon-
duct that can galvanize the public to set aside its approval of a presi-
dent's performance and support resignation or formal removal. 
Future members of Congress might support removal only if they have 
direct evidence of very serious wrongdoing and unambiguous consen-
sus (in Congress and among the public) on the gravity of such 
wrongdoing. 58 
57. Of the thirty-eight senators who published statements on their reasons for voting 
not guilty on both articles, more than half-twenty-six-explained that they did not regard 
the misconduct alleged in either article of impeachment approved by the House as consti-
tuting an impeachable offense. See 145 CoNe. REc. S1576-78 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) 
(statement of Sen. Akaka); id. at S1476-95 (statement of Sen. Biden); id. at S1511-12 (state-
ment of Sen. Boxer); id. atS1500-01 (statement of Sen. Breaux); id. atS1608-10 (statement 
of Sen. Bryan); id. at S1524 (statement of Sen. Clelend); id. at S1568-69 (statement of Sen. 
Collins); id. at S1618-20 (statement of Sen. Dorgan); id. at S1530-32 (statement of Sen. 
Durbin); id. at S1560-61 (statement of Sen. Graham); id. at S1627-28 (statement of Sen. 
Hollings); id. at S1594-97 (statement of Sen. Jeffords); id. at S1474-75 (statement of Sen. 
Johnson); id. at S1566-68 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id. at Sl620-22 (statement of Sen. 
Kerry); id. at S1547-48 (statement of Sen. Kohl); id. at S1578-79 (statement of Sen. Leahy); 
id. at S1543-46 (statement of Sen. Levin); id. at S1600-05 (statement of Sen. Lieberman); id. 
at S1625-26 (statement of Sen. Lincoln); id. at S1498-99 (statement of Sen. Mikulski); id. at 
S1559-60 (statement of Sen. Moynihan); id. at S1574-75 (statement of Sen. Reid); id. at 
S1502.()4 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes); id. at S1669-71 (statement of Sen. Snowe); id. at 
S1597-98 (statement of Sen. Wellstone). 
58. Whereas President Clinton's acquittal might make it more difficult for Congress to 
use impeachment against a popular president, it underscores the greater vulnerability to 
impeachment and removal for those officials who lack a president's resources, such as 
recourse to the bully pulpit, or popularity. It is hardly inconceivable that an unpopular 
president such as Andrew Johnson might meet a different fate in an age in which the 
media constantly applies pressure to investigate a president's misconduct (or actions that 
have made him unpopular) and in which daily polls can dramatize a loss of popularity and 
an increase in support for removal. In these circumstances, removal or resignation might 
be extremely likely. To date, the only instance like this occurred during the final days of 
Richard Nixon's presidency, when the public, for the first and only time during the Water-
gate investigation, expressed support for the President's ouster based on information re-
vealed on the Watergate tapes. See STANLEY!. KuTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE 531 (1990) 
(citing poll results that "showed public opinion favoring impeachment 66-27 percent" and 
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Finally, independent of whatever reconciliation Congress may 
reach, Clinton's acquittal will likely be construed as casting doubt 
upon the House's judgment to impeach the President. This may help 
wash away any deleterious effects the impeachment might have had 
on the presidency. The most notorious acquittals in the nineteenth 
century, namely those of President Andrew Johnson and Justice Sam-
uel Chase, have each had the effect of dissuading subsequent con-
gresses from initiating impeachments based on similar misconduct. 
The Clinton acquittal could be construed by subsequent congresses as 
rejecting the House's judgment on the impeachability of the Presi-
dent's misconduct. 
The vote to impeach the President was (as it had been in Chase's 
and Johnson's cases) largely cast along partisan lines, 59 and there is 
widespread perception that the proceedings were conducted and re-
solved on partisan grounds.60 Moreover, most people (including most 
members of Congress) largely agree about the underlying facts in 
President Clinton's case; they disagree primarily over the legal signifi-
cance of those facts. Subsequent congresses can reasonably conclude 
that if such misconduct did not merit a conviction in President Clin-
ton's case, it would be unfair or inconsistent to allow similar misbehav-
ior to support a conviction. 
B. The Standards for Impeaching Presidents and judges 
A divisive constitutional issue in the Clinton impeachment pro-
ceedings was whether there are different constitutional standards for 
impeaching presidents and judges. This issue arose because one fed-
eral judge (Harry Claiborne) had been impeached and removed from 
office for having engaged in private misconduct unrelated to his office 
(tax evasion), while two others had been impeached and removed 
from office for having committed offenses like those with which Bill 
Clinton was charged (Walter Nixon for making false statements to a 
that "[p]ro-impeachment sentiment had risen 13 percent in one week"). This dynamic is 
likely to be even more problematic for a federal judge, including a Supreme Court justice, 
whose hearings are not likely to get anything near the widespread media coverage, the 
outpouring of public support, and the opposition to the prolongation of hearings that 
were present with the Clinton proceedings. In the absence of these factors, a federal judge 
or other low-profile official simply lacks the resources available to a president (particularly 
a popular one) in defending against political retaliation in the form of impeachment. 
59. See 144 CoNe. REc. H12,040-42 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998) (listing a member-by-mem-
ber tally of the House vote on articles of impeachment). 
60. See Poll Update ABC Poll: 71% Say Impeach Vote Based on Partisan Politics, HOTLINE 
(The American Political Network, Alexandria, Va.), Feb. 16, 1999. 
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grand jury and Alcee Hastings for perjury and bribery) .61 If the stan-
dards were the same for impeaching presidents and judges, the case 
for President Clinton's removal would have been stronger. 
The strongest argument for applying different standards for im-
peaching presidents and judges is that impeaching a president is more 
likely to destabilize the executive branch than impeaching a judge 
would the judicial branch. Because all judicial power is not vested in 
or subject to the control of a single person, impeaching a judge, even 
a Supreme Courtjustice, does not have the potential to bring the en-
tire judicial system to a halt. In contrast, the fact that the entire exec-
utive branch is under the control and supervision of a single 
individual, the president, creates a greater likelihood that impeaching 
him would paralyze or frustrate the operations of an entire branch. 
Hence, a higher or tougher standard for impeaching a president 
would be required than for impeaching a judge. 
A significant problem with this argument is the fact that Clinton's 
impeachment proceedings did not come anywhere close to paralyzing 
the executive branch. For most of their duration, the impeachment 
proceedings did not deflect the President from doing his job.62 To 
the extent that they did so, the ensuing paralysis was no different than 
the paralysis that invariably results from government divided by a Con-
gress dominated by one party and a White House occupied by some-
one from the other. Congress exemplified this point by allowing the 
President to give his annual State of the Union address on the evening 
of the day on which the defense in his impeachment trial began.63 In 
addition, the stock market reached unprecedented heights during the 
impeachment proceedings.64 Last, but not least, most work in the ex-
ecutive branch is done by subordinates, rather than by the president, 
61. Hearing on the Background and History of Impeachment, supra note 55, at 53 (prepared 
statement of Michael J. Gerhardt, Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary). 
62. See PosNER, supra note 48, at 149 ("There is no indication that President Clinton's 
affair with Monica Lewinksy, or even the first seven months or so of its legal and political 
aftermath, reduced the time that he devoted to his official duties or dangerously distracted 
him from them."). 
63. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Clinton Defense Blasts Evidence as Distorted; Lawyers Call Disputes 
'Trivial', WASH. PosT,Jan. 21,1999, at AI. 
64. See Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Nasdaq, S&P 500 Climb to Records; Analysts Hail Stock Mar-
ket's Strength, WASH. PosT, Dec. 22, 1998, at C1 ("On Friday, in the face of impeach-
ment ... , blue-chip stocks rallied and the Nasdaq composite index set a new record."); 
James K. Glassman, Four Golden Years and Going for More, WASH. PosT, Dec. 27, 1998, at H1 
("Bucking dire predictions about the effects of impeachment, declining earnings and sky-
high price-to-earnings ratios, the stock market has risen for the past six sessions in a row 
and could return more than 30 percent in 1999."). 
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so it is not clear how much the incapacity of a president, for any rea-
son, necessarily would cause the government to grind to a standstill. 
A second argument for adopting different standards for impeach-
ing presidents and judges is that partisan politics will play a bigger 
role in presidential impeachments than judicial ones because presi-
dents are elected officials.65 This argument ignores, however, the sig-
nificance of the radically different resources available to presidents 
and judges for combating attempted impeachments. The President's 
impeachment proceedings dramatically illustrated how presidents can 
rally to their defenses political parties, interest groups, academicians, 
and, perhaps the most important of all, the American people. They 
can even exact special advantages for themselves such as having their 
lawyers present while they are being questioned before a grandjury.66 
Such power weighs against a president's need for a higher impeach-
ment threshold. Indeed, federal judges who lack such resources need 
at least as high a standard as presidents for their impeachments as a 
means of protecting their otherwise fragile tenure. 
Moreover, judges, though unelected, can be victims of politically 
charged reprisals. Consider the case of Judge Harold Baer. Shortly 
after Judge Baer had granted a motion to suppress based on his find-
ing that federal agents had conducted an illegal search in a drug dis-
tribution case,67 Bob Dole, who was then the Republican candidate 
for president, threatened the judge with impeachment, 68 while Presi-
dent Clinton, who had appointed Baer, indicated that he was consid-
ering asking the judge to resign.69 Though several appellate judges 
from the Second Circuit denounced the threatened impeachment as 
a violation of the judge's constitutionally protected independence,70 
Judge Baer reversed himself, 71 giving rise to the suspicion that the 
external political pressures altered his decisionmaking. 
Yet another argument for adopting higher thresholds for im-
peaching presidents than judges is that judges, not presidents, have a 
65. See PoSNER, supra note 48, at 104. 
66. /d. at 152. 
67. United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated on reconsider-
ation, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
68. See Don Van Natta Jr., judges Defend a Colleague from Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 
1996, at B1 (reporting that "Senator Dole called for Judge Baer's impeachment [stating 
that] '[w)e don't needjudges who try to find excuses for more criminal behavior'"). 
69. /d. 
70. See id. (stating that the judges found these threats to be "an extraordinary intimida-
tion" and that the attacks "do a grave disservice to the principle of an independent 
judiciary"). 
71. United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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duty to symbolize or personifY the law.72 Such a difference in duties, 
however, does not signifY that the meaning of "high Crimes and Mis-
demeanors"73 depends on whether a judge or president is being im-
peached. Instead, the constitutional standard for impeachment could 
be the same, with the difference in duties shaping the circumstances 
and context in which the uniform standard is applied. 74 
There are further arguments that cut against applying different 
standards for presidential and judicial impeachments. One is that the 
assertion is counter-historical. It conflicts with the framers' obvious 
intention to adopt the phrase "during good Behaviour"75 to distin-
guish judicial tenure (life) from the tenure of elected officials (such 
as the president), rather than to establish the particular terms of judi-
cial removat.76 The argument that the Constitution establishes differ-
ent standards for impeaching presidents and judges is a relatively new 
one in the annals of impeachment history. For instance, President 
Johnson never made such a claim, though his impeachment had been 
preceded by four judicial impeachments, including Associate Justice 
Samuel Chase's.77 
Yet another argument supporting uniform impeachment stan-
dards derives from historical practices. Congress has never endorsed 
the proposition that there are different standards for impeaching 
presidents and judges. Indeed, though some members of Congress 
asserted the argument in the midst of the impeachment attempts 
against Justice William Douglas, President Nixon, and the three 
judges removed in the 1980s, neither the House nor the Senate ever 
took a vote on the question in any of those proceedings. Moreover, of 
the seventeen senators who expressed an opinion about this issue in 
the Clinton impeachment trial, eleven (ten Republicans and one 
72. See PosNER, supra note 48, at 104 ("The judge symbolizes law and so even his rela-
tively minor crimes gravely undermine the system of legal justice."). 
73. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 4. 
74. Similarly, the simple fact that the consequences that might ensue from an attempt 
to impeach a president might be different from those that would result from the removal 
of a judge is not an adequate basis for employing different constitutional standards for 
impeaching presidents and judges. Rather, the consequences of impeaching an official 
could be factors taken into account by Congress in the course of applying the same opera-
tive standard. 
75. U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 1. 
76. See MICHAEL]. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PRocEss: A CoNSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 83-86 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the applicability of the "good 
behavior" clause to the impeachment process). 
77. See id. at 183. 
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Democrat) took the position that the same standard applies for im-
peaching presidents and federal judges. 78 
The most plausible precedents for this point of view are the im-
peachment and removal of Judges John Pickering (for drunkenness 
and insanityf9 and Harry Claiborne (for income tax evasion) 80 be-
cause each judge was removed for misconduct arguably unrelated to 
his official duties. Yet, neither precedent supports a looser standard 
for impeaching federal judges. In fact, John Pickering was impeached 
and removed because he could no longer function as a federal judge 
and because there was no other alternative for dealing with a judge 
who had, in the estimation of Congress, become completely dysfunc-
tional.81 This same reasoning led to the ouster of Harry Claiborne, as 
reflected in the House Report on his impeachment.82 The latter indi-
cates that a central concern of House members (who voted unani-
mously to impeach him) was that he had become completely disabled 
from functioning as a federal judge because of his criminal conduct 
and conviction.83 
In the final analysis, the Clinton impeachment proceedings do 
not establish any firm precedent for analyzing judicial and presiden-
tial impeachments under different standards. The Clinton proceed-
ings hardly produced any consensus on that question, nor do any of 
the other usual sources of decision, such as historical practices, settle 
the issue. 
78. See 145 CoNG. REc. Sl561-62 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen. Allard); id. 
at Sl509 (statement of Sen. Bond); id. at Sl605-08 (statement of Sen. Brownback); id. at 
Sl517-21 (statement of Sen. Fitzgerald); id. at Sl526-29 (statement of Sen. Frist); id. at 
Sl462-65 (statement of Sen. Gorton); id. at Sl499-1500 (statement of Sen. Grams); id. at 
Sl504-05 (statement of Sen. Kerrey); id. at Sl532-34 (statement of Sen. Kyl); id. at Sl512-17 
(statement of Sen. Mack); id. at Sl562-66 (statement of Sen. McConnell). Some senators, 
however, supported different standards for impeaching presidents and judges. Id. at Sl477 
(statement of Sen. Biden); id. at Sl620-22 (statement of Sen. Kerry); id. at Sl547-48 (state-
ment of Sen. Kohl); id. at Sl509-ll (statement of Sen. Robb); id. at Sl502.{)4 (statement of 
Sen. Sarbanes). 
79. See Hearing on the Background and History of Impeachment, sufrra note 55, at 358 (set-
ting forth the articles of impeachment against Judge Pickering). 
80. See id. at 368 (setting forth the articles of impeachment against Judge Claiborne). 
81. See GERHARDT, sufrra note 76, at 50-51 (discussing Judge Pickering's impeachment 
and removal). 
82. H.R. REP. No. 99-668, at 23 (1986). 
83. I d. (asserting that Judge Claiborne's falsification of a tax return undermined public 
confidence in the judicial system and that "[s]uch a result render[ed] him unfit to con-
tinue to serve on the federal bench"). 
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C. The Limited Utility of Impeachment in the Modem Age 
One commonly overlooked consequence of President Clinton's 
acquittal is that it is likely to underscore the lack of utility of impeach-
ment as an effective weapon against serious presidential abuses of 
power. Mter Richard Nixon's forced resignation in the face of likely 
impeachment, only one other official faced with the threat of im-
peachment has resigned.84 Otherwise, the threat and even the fact of 
impeachment have not forced any other officials to resign, including 
two who, prior to their impeachments, had been convicted and im-
prisoned.85 Clinton himself, backed by popular support throughout 
his impeachment proceedings, ignored more than one hundred news-
paper editorials calling upon him to resign.86 
The threat of impeachment no longer seems to carry the stigma it 
once did. Federal judges, as demonstrated by Judges Claiborne and 
Nixon, can continue to receive their judicial salaries, regardless of 
their imprisonment, unless or until they have been formally removed 
from office.87 Moreover, impeachable officials can expect congres-
sional inertia against mobilizing impeachment proceedings. Mem-
bers of Congress-now constantly in the public eye thanks to the 
twenty-four-hour news cycle-have little incentive to conduct im-
84. GERHARDT, supra note 76, at 204 n.36. The official in question was Robert Collins, a 
federal district judge, who was convicted for bribery, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice. 
!d. After his convictions were upheld, he was imprisoned. !d. While Collins was incarcer-
ated and still receiving his judicial salary, the Judicial Conference of the United States 
formally certified to the House its conclusion that "Judge Collins has engaged in conduct 
which might constitute one or more grounds for impeachment." !d. (quoting House Urged 
to Impeach Jailed judge, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1993, at N8). 
85. The two officials were Harry Claiborne (convicted of tax evasion), see supra note 80 
and accompanying text, and Walter Nixon (convicted of making false statements to a 
grand jury), see Hearing on the Background and History of Impeachment, supra note 55, at 370 
(enumerating the articles of impeachment against Judge Nixon). Both judges were con-
victed for their criminal offenses and were incarcerated, but were still receiving judicial 
salaries at the times of their respective impeachments. GERHARDT, supra note 76, at 88-89 
(Claiborne); Rodino Calls for Ouster of Convicted U.S. District judge, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1988, 
at 19 (Nixon). 
86. See, e.g., Editorial, A Betrayed Trust: It Is Time, Mr. President, to Resign, DENVER PosT, 
Aug. 19, 1998, at BlO; Editorial, A Matter of Integrity: Clinton Should Resign, USA TODAY, Sept. 
14, 1998, at 18A; Editorial, President Clinton Should Resign Now, BoSTON HERALD, Dec. 21, 
1998, at 34; Editorial, Resign Now Mr. President, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at A18; Edito-
rial, Resignation the Only Responsible option; Call for Courage. President Clinton Must Abandon 
His Instinct for Self-Preseroation and Do What's Right, ATLANTA]. & CoNsT., Sept. 13, 1998, at 
6G. 
87. See GERHARDT, supra note 76, at 91 ("Imprisoned judges retain their titles, salaries, 
pensions, benefits, and, most importantly, their ability to return to the bench with full 
authority to decide cases and controversies."); see also United States v. Claiborne, 765 F.2d 
784, 788 (1985) (pointing out that throughout his trial, conviction, and appeal, Judge 
Claiborne "continue[d] to hold office as a United States district judge"). 
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peachment proceedings if doing so means displacing time and re-
sources from legislative matters of greater concern to their 
constituents. Nor is Congress sufficiently well equipped to conduct 
exhaustive investigations quickly; neither the media nor the public is 
likely to be very patient with protracted hearings-especially if the 
public consensus is that removal from office is not warranted. The 
longer a president can stretch out or hinder an investigation, the 
longer he has to demonstrate that his "misconduct" has not disabled 
him from doing his duties and that Congress is on a partisan witch-
hunt. Regardless ofwhether one thinks Clinton should have been re-
moved from office for the misconduct that was the subject of his im-
peachment proceedings, even before the hearings began, the public 
had reached a judgment that he had not done anything legitimately 
impeachable.88 In Clinton's case, House and Senate Republicans 
were never able, even with extraordinary press coverage, to shake the 
public's impatience with the impeachment hearings or its lack of faith 
in their partisan origins. 
The critical question is what might happen in the future if a sit-
ting president does something that a majority of Americans and con-
gressional leaders regard as a legitimate basis for his removal. In such 
circumstances, it is hard to imagine that a president would be able to 
remain in office for the duration of any impeachment proceedings. 
Once a president loses substantial support from both the public and 
leaders of Congress, he will face incredible pressures to resign.89 
While a stubborn leader might refuse to leave office voluntarily, stub-
bornness in the face of substantial public outcry is likely to intensify 
the pressure to resign rather than alleviate it. Under such circum-
88. See Guy Gugliotta, Impeachment Inquiry Discussed in House; Leaders Consider Logistics of 
Probe but Link Decision with Caveat on Stronger Evidence, WASH. PosT, Feb. 10, 1998, at A9 
(reporting that "[t]he House leadership has quietly begun to consider the logistics of a 
possible impeachment inquiry against President Clinton," but that "[a] Wall Street Jour-
nal/NBC News poll ... showed [Clinton] with a towering 79 percent approval rating"); id. 
(citing a Newsweek poll that found that forty-nine percent of the public thought that "the 
president shouldn't be impeached even if he told Lewinsky to lie about the alleged affair"); 
Richard Morin, Approval of Congress Drops in Poll; Most Reject Probe; Clinton's Rating Higher, 
WASH. PoST, Oct. 12, 1998, at A1 (discussing a Washington Post survey that found that "Clin-
ton is more popular now than he was before Thursday's House vote to begin impeachment 
proceedings" and that "67 percent [of Americans] say they approve of the job Clinton is 
doing as president"); Richard Morin, Public Blames Clinton, Gives &cord Suppart, WASH. 
PosT, Feb. 15, 1999, at A1 (reporting that "56 percent [of the public] said the Senate 
should 'drop the [impeachment] case without censuring Clinton'"). 
89. Cf Abbe D. Lowell, Impeachment Was Never the Objective, NAT'L LJ.,Jan. 17, 2000, at 
A19 (asserting that the congressional leaders' demands for the president's resignation in 
the face of impeachment carry little weight without the support of public opinion). 
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stances, a president would appear unrepentant and indifferent to the 
consequences of his misconduct. 
Such was the case with Richard Nixon. The public resistance to 
his removal persisted throughout most of the duration of the congres-
sional investigations into his involvement with the Watergate break-in 
and cover-up.90 But once his guilt was established in the public's 
mind and in the minds of most congressional leaders, public opinion, 
for the first time, shifted against his remaining in office.91 Nixon read 
the writing on the wall, and resigned. 
Clinton's acquittal has demonstrated that public support for a 
president can outlast the formal impeachment process. Nixon's resig-
nation-forced by the will of the public-demonstrated that where 
misconduct is widely viewed as legitimately impeachable, formal im-
peachment proceedings can be rendered obsolete by pressure from 
an impatient public that demands resignation. In the future, as the 
information age progresses even further, it is unlikely that the formal 
impeachment process will have much, if any, utility as a means to re-
dress presidential misconduct where an informed public increasingly 
applies pressure to secure the same result as the formal impeachment 
process was originally designed to effect. 
III. IMPEACHMENT ALTERNATIVEs PosT-CuNTON 
Aside from a forced resignation, there are four other possible al-
ternatives to impeachment. Below, I consider the feasibility of each. 
A. Prosecuting a Sitting President 
Yet another issue that arose in the Clinton impeachment pro-
ceedings was whether a sitting president could be criminally indicted 
or prosecuted. If so, then it is conceivable that the president could be 
vulnerable to impeachment on the basis of incapacity because of im-
prisonment or distraction caused by the need to defend himself. If 
not, then one of two prospects could arise. The first would be the 
disturbing specter of a lawbreaking president remaining in office and 
awaiting punishment until after he leaves office. The other might be 
the increased pressure on Congress to expedite an impeachment to 
make it possible for a president to stand trial sooner rather than later. 
90. See KUTLER, supra note 58, at 380 (noting that in June 1973, sixty-two percent of 
Americans were opposed to forcing Nixon's resignation). 
91. See id. at 531 (noting that by August 1974, public opinion had shifted dramatically 
and that sixty-six percent of the public favored impeachment). 
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The major argument for immunizing a sitting president from in-
dictment or prosecution is the same as the best argument for having a 
higher threshold for impeaching presidents than for impeaching 
judges-that the proceedings would unduly paralyze the executive 
branch.92 Prosecuting other high-ranking officials, such as Supreme 
Court justices or members of Congress, would not have the effect of 
paralyzing the operations of an entire branch. Indicting or prosecut-
ing a president would, however, because the executive branch is 
unique in that a single person, the president, oversees its administra-
tion. The problem with this argument is that it is hard to imagine that 
such an indictment or prosecution would be any (or much) more 
debilitating than a presidential impeachment trial, which did not par-
alyze the executive branch in the case of President Clinton. 
A second argument for barring indictment or prosecution of a 
sitting president is that a president has the constitutional means to 
frustrate prosecutorial efforts by pardoning himself.93 If a president 
may pardon himself, then, it becomes practically impossible to ensure 
that a criminal indictment or prosecution of a president can ever be 
accomplished, at least as a practical matter.94 It is true that the ab-
sence of any express constitutional prohibition against a president's 
authority to pardon himself supports the plausibility of such a situa-
tion arising. The Constitution, however, provides a significant check 
on such an abuse of power-the federal impeachment process. The 
presence of this check, in the circumstances described above, should 
operate as a strong disincentive to a president who is considering par-
doning himself. Abuse of power was a common example of an im-
peachable offense given in the constitutional and ratifYing 
conventions, 95 and it is hard to imagine a better example of such 
abuse than a president using his pardon power to avoid criminal ac-
countability for his misconduct. Indeed, it is an example that several 
92. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, In Praise of Impeachment, AM. LAw., Sept. 1998, at 92, 93 
(arguing that "[s]uch a prosecution, even if unsuccessful, could effectively ... incapacitate 
[a president] and thereby nullify a national election"). 
93. See PosNER, supra note 48, at 108 ("There is no case law on the question, of course, 
but it has generally been inferred from the breadth of the constitutional language that the 
president can indeed pardon himself .... " (citing Ken Gormley, Impeachment and the Inde-
pendent Counsel: A Dysfunctional Union, 51 STAN. L. REv. 309, 323 (1993))). 
94. See id. at 108 (stating that because "the President probably does have the power to 
pardon himself . . . the entire subject of criminally prosecuting Presidents is rather 
academic"). 
95. See, e.g., 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION oF 1787, at 65-66 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1966) (statement of James Madison) (discussing the need for impeachment to 
prevent against abuses of presidential power and trust). 
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framers and ratifiers cited to illustrate the scope of the impeachment 
power.96 
B. Censure 
The Clinton impeachment proceedings provided the most pro-
longed public debate about the propriety of censure in American his-
tory. During the course of this debate, the arguments against censure 
were made very clear. First, impeachment is the only means by which 
the Constitution authorizes censure of a president.97 Second, censure 
might constitute a bill of attainder,98 which is a legislative attempt to 
punish an individual in the absence of a judicial trial. 99 Judge Richard 
Posner endorses the latter argument and is confident that a censure, 
coupled with a fine, would be punitive, and thus, an illegitimate bill of 
attainder.100 He is also certain that "if punitive purpose is the test for 
whether a congressional enactment is a bill of attainder, then a resolu-
tion censuring President Clinton would have been a bill of attainder, 
for the only and the undeniable purpose would have been to punish 
him."Ioi 
These arguments do not, however, convincingly eliminate cen-
sure as a legitimate option for Congress to consider using in future 
cases of presidential misconduct. To begin with, the first argument 
rests on a mistaken premise-that impeachment is the only constitu-
tionally authorized means for dealing with presidential misconduct. 
Impeachment has no bearing on what Congress may do with respect 
to misconduct that does not rise to the level of an impeachable of-
fense; it is only relevant as the exclusive means for removing a presi-
dent for impeachable misconduct. The impeachment power therefore 
96. See, e.g., 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CoNVENTIONS oN THE ADoPTION oF 
THE FEDERAL CoNSTITUTION 498 (Taylor & Maury eds., 2d ed., 1854) (statement of james 
Madison during the Virginia ratifying convention); 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CoN-
VENTION OF 1787, supra note 95, at 550 (statement of Colonel Mason). 
97. See U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 4 ("The President ... shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors."). 
98. See id. art. I, § 9, d. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder ... shall be passed."). 
99. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 127 (6th ed. 1990). 
100. PosNER, supra note 48, at 191. 
101. /d. at 192. Posner further explains that shaming the president by means of a cen-
sure could hurt him tangibly because "it would be like a blacklist; it would mark [the presi-
dent] as a wrongdoer and might deprive him of certain employment opportunities, such as 
a university presidency." /d. Posner is also satisfied that censure is a poor substitute for 
impeachment, which operated in President Clinton's case as "an effective, powerful, and 
legitimate form of shaming penalty." /d. at 195. 
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sheds no light on the options for dealing with unimpeachable 
misconduct. 
Moreover, the constitutional text seems to allow censure. Article 
I, section 3 provides that 'judgments in Cases of Impeachment shall 
not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification 
to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the 
United States."102 This text seems to leave open the possibility of sanc-
tions less severe than removal, such as censure. 
Also, by virtue of the First Amendment, the speech or debate 
clause, 103 and the mandate for each chamber to maintain a journal, 104 
the Constitution clearly allows individual senators to record publicly 
their condemnation of a president's misconduct. If the senators may 
engage in such expression individually, it is hard to see why they may 
not do so collectively. There is also nothing in the Constitution that 
bars a senator from asking her colleagues to sign a document that 
castigates the president and then entering that document into the 
Congressional Record. A censure is the functional equivalent of this ac-
tion. While one could object that censure might become either a po-
litically futile act or overused to frustrate or harass a president (or 
some other official), these are prudential, nonconstitutional objec-
tions. 105 The calculation of whether a censure is constitutional is sep-
arate and distinct from whether it makes political sense to use it in any 
given case. 
Finally, several presidents, including Presidents Jackson, Tyler, 
and Buchanan, have been censured in resolutions passed by the 
House or the Senate.106 Even if one could argue that the House's 
impeachment of President Clinton somehow constitutes a precedent 
against censure, there are numerous other instances in which mem-
102. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. 
103. !d. § 6, cl. 1 ("The Senators and Representatives shall ... be privileged from Arrest 
during ... any speech or Debate in either House ... ."). 
104. The Constitution requires each chamber of Congress to "keep a Journal of its Pro-
ceedings." !d. § 5, cl. 3. 
105. Prior to the House's vote to impeach President Clinton, Representative William 
Delahunt sought opinions regarding the constitutionality of censure from the nineteen 
constitutional scholars and historians who testified about the background and history of 
impeachment in the special hearing held by the House Subcommittee on the Constitution 
on November 9, 1999. See Letter from Rep. William D. Delahunt to Rep. Henry J. Hyde, 
Chair, House Comm. on the Judiciary (Dec. 4, 1998) (on file with author). Fourteen of 
the nineteen constitutional scholars indicated that they thought censure was constitu-
tional. See Letter from Rep. William D. Delahunt & Frederick C. Boucher to Members of 
the U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 15, 1998) (on file with author). 
106. JACK MAsKELL, CENSURE OF THE PRESIDENT BY CoNGREss 3-6 (Congressional Re-
search Serv. No. 98-843 A, Sept. 29, 1998). 
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hers of Congress approved censure.107 In terms of historical practices, 
there is much more evidence supporting, rather than foreclosing, cen-
sure as a means by which to address presidential misconduct, particu-
larly misconduct that does not rise to the level of "Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."108 
C. The Electoral Process 
During President Clinton's impeachment proceedings, his de-
fenders argued that one forum in which he could have (perhaps even 
should have) been held accountable for his misconduct was the elec-
toral pr~cess. 109 Had the 2000 presidential election ended in a clear-
cut popular and electoral vote victory for either George W. Bush orAl 
Gore, it is possible that it could have been treated as a referendum (to 
some degree) on Bill Clinton. But it is much more likely than not that 
the disputed claim of the victor (for it will be disputed by the loser 
and his supporters) will make it difficult to read much significance 
into the election for purposes of clarifying Bill Clinton's legacy. 
Consider the possible problems with any claim that the election 
constituted a referendum on the Clinton impeachment. If, for exam-
ple, George W. Bush (the apparent winner when I wrote this piece) 
were to prevail, his supporters, if not he, would no doubt claim to 
some degree that his victory vindicates his campaign theme to restore 
"honor and dignity" to the presidency.U0 They might argue further 
that both Gore's reluctance to campaign with Bill Clinton at his 
side,111 and his mistaken factual assertions in the debates,112 amplified 
I07. See id. 
I08. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4; see MAsKELL, supra note I06, at 3-6. 
I09. Cf Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Public Blames Clinton, Gives Record Support, 
WASH. PosT, Feb. 15, I999, at AI (discussing the possible impact the Clinton "scandals" 
might have on the 2000 elections). 
IIO. On a number of occasions, Bush pledged to restore "honor and dignity" to the 
presidency. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, Candidates' Problem Is Finding One to Fix; Education, 
Health Care, Taxes, Values Stand in for Absent Economic Concerns, WASH. PosT, Dec. I6, I999, at 
A2; Terry M. Neal, Bush Will Hit Gore on Ethics; Governor's Team, RNC Plot Strategy, WASH. 
PosT, Mar. II, 2000, at A6; Terry M. Neal & Edward Walsh, Bush: Clinton s Character Not an 
Issue; In Interview, He Says Voters Draw Own Conclusions About His Pledges of 'Honor and Dignity, ' 
WASH. PoST, Aug. 6, 2000, at AI8. 
III. SeeR. W. Apple Jr., Democrats: The Overview; Gore, in Debut as a Presidential Nominee, 
Says 'I Stand Here Tonight as My Own Man,' N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. I8, 2000, at AI (noting Gore's 
efforts to distance himself from President Clinton during his campaign for the presi-
dency); David S. Broder, Editorial, Gore's Clinton Dilemma, WASH. PosT, Oct. 24, 2000, at 
A27 (discussing Gore's decision to separate himself from Clinton during the presidential 
campaign). 
II2. See Ceci Connolly & Terry M. Neal, Nominees Carry Debate Themes Back on Road; Bush 
Attacks Rivals Veracity as Gore Decries Negative Politics, WASH. PosT, Oct. 5, 2000, at AI8 (re-
porting Bush's post-debate criticism of Vice President Gore's "purposeful distortion of 
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by their resonance with Clinton's disputed lack of integrity, could con-
firm or illustrate the impact of the so-called scandals of the Clinton 
presidency on the election. In other words, the fact that Gore lacked 
Clinton's warmth-or charisma, some would say-and did some 
things that reminded many people of why they disliked Clinton, cost 
Gore the support of many voters and, some would say, the election. 
Of course there are many problems with these arguments. First, 
Gore won the popular vote.U3 Moreover, he has a credible claim that 
a majority of Florida voters intended to vote for him rather than Bush 
even if a critical portion of them failed to do so.114 In addition, 
Gore's distancing himself from Clinton arguably reduced the degree 
to which Clinton (or his misconduct) was in any sense on the ballot. 
And, of course, Hillary Clinton's victory in her run for the Senate,115 
not to mention the seats gained by the Democrats in both the House 
and the Senate, 116 suggests that the effects of the so-called Clinton 
scandals of which she was often alleged to be a part, if not a principal, 
were quite limited. 
If, however, Vice President Gore were to prevail (a highly unlikely 
scenario at the time I write this), the significance of the so-called Clin-
ton scandals would be reduced even further. To be sure, such a result 
would mean, even in the disputed circumstances under which Gore 
would ascend to the presidency, that the Bush theme did not resonate 
to the extent his campaign had hoped and that the voters were not 
prepared to agree with the Republicans on the relevance of Gore's or 
[Governor Bush's] proposals"); Glenn Kessler, Debaters' Messages: Not the Whole Truth; Mis-
statements and Omissions Abound, WASH. PosT, Oct. 18, 2000, at A15 (discussing the many 
misleading or mistaken assertions made by each candidate during the presidential 
debates). 
113. As of this writing, Gore led Bush in the national election results by over 350,000 
votes. CNN.com Election 2000 Results, at http:/ /www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/re-
sults/ (visited Dec. 4, 2000). 
114. See generally John Mintz & Dan Keating, Ra. Ballot Spoilage Likelier for Blacks; Voting 
Machines, Confusion Cited, WASH. PosT, Dec. 3, 2000, at A1; Peter Slevin, Absentee GOP Bal-
lots; Democrat Alleges Unfair Application Corrections, WASH. PosT, Dec. 2, 2000, at A16; Roberto 
Suro, Lawsuit Alleges Misconduct; Filing Says Gore Lost 4,000 Votes in 3 Counties, WASH. PoST, 
Nov. 28, 2000, at A1; Roberto Suro & Peter Slevin, Gore Recount Request Argued in Florida 
Trial; Vice President's Experts Face Tough Questions, WASH. PoST, Dec. 3, 2000, at A1; Edward 
Walsh, Gore Asserts He Won in Florida; Democrat Makes Case to Public as Bush Transition Moves 
Forward, WASH. PosT, Nov. 30, 2000, at Al. 
115. Richard L. Berke, Bush and Gore Vie for an Edge with Narrow Electoral Split; Hillary 
Clinton Goes to Senate; Florida Is Pivota~ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at AI. 
116. See Adam Clymer, Bush Barely Ahead of Gore in Florida as Recount Holds Key to the 
Election; G.O.P. Retains Control, but Democrats Gain in Both Chambers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, 
at A1 ("Democratic gains in the House and Senate on Tuesday fell short of control but 
produced the most narrowly divided Congress in almost half a century. Democrats gained 
at least three Senate seats and one or two in the House."). 
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Clinton's misconduct to the selection of a president. Moreover, a 
Gore victory would not necessarily be inconsistent with the public's 
desire to put the Clinton scandals behind them. For one thing, 
Gore's own campaign, especially after his bold choice of Senator Jo-
seph Lieberman as his running mate, 117 signaled his desire to distance 
himself from Clinton's scandalous behavior. In addition, a Gore vic-
tory might signal the public's (continuing) impatience with efforts to 
capitalize politically-as was tried unsuccessfully in the impeachment 
process-on scandal-mongering. 
The major problem with drawing these inferences from a Gore 
victory is that the victory will require or depend on a court decision to 
overturn certification of the Florida election ·in Bush's favor.U 8 Al-
though some could argue that it was scandalous for a Co-Chair of 
Bush's campaign in Florida, Katherine Harris, not to recuse herself 
from the process of certifying the election results for Bush, the rheto-
ric directed against her choices as secretary of state would be nothing 
compared to the vitriol and charges of scandal that Republicans 
would direct against Gore for having "stolen" the election from Bush. 
Of course, if George W. Bush were to win the election, but the 
composition of the House and Senate were to change to benefit the 
Democrats (a development that seems likely at the time I write), a 
mixed signal would be sent. This scenario would support the view that 
many voters wanted to hold Bill Clinton and those closest to him ac-
countable for the scandals associated with his administration. It 
would also indicate, however, that the voters did not associate such 
scandals with the Democratic Party itself. Moreover, this scenario 
would probably signal that many voters were not prepared to reward 
congressional Republicans for their leadership in steering the country 
through an impeachment ordeal. 
D. "RIP" 
Over the past few decades, politicians (and their allies) have in-
creasingly used congressional hearings, criminal investigations, and 
judicial proceedings to thwart their opponents' campaigns and poli-
cymaking. Use of these methods has, at times, served as a substitute 
117. See Dan Balz & Ceci Connolly, 'We Will Make History Again'; Lieberman Will Help 'Tear 
Down a Mighty Wall of Division,' Gore Says, WASH. Posr, Aug. 9, 2000, at A1 (reporting Gore's 
choice of Sen. Joseph Lieberman as his running mate). 
118. See generally Dan Balz, FUrrida Certifies Bush Winner; Gore Campaign Vows to Contest; 
Republican to Begin Transition, WASH. PosT, Nov. 27, 2000, at A1 (discussing the certification 
of the Florida election and Vice President Gore's plan to challenge that result); Roberto 
Suro &Jo Becker, Gore's Fight Shifts to Courtroom, WASH. Posr, Nov. 27, 2000, at A1 (same). 
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for formal impeachment proceedings. In 1990, political scientists 
Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter dubbed this phenomenon 
"RIP"-standing for "revelation, investigation, and prosecution."119 
In their view: 
electoral success often fails to confer the capacity to govern, 
and political forces have been able to exercise considerable 
power even if they lose at the polls or, indeed, do not com-
pete in the electoral arena. As the twentieth century draws 
to a close, America is entering what might be called a pos-
telectoral era in which RIP threatens to displace presidential 
elections. 120 
Watergate marked RIP's dramatic origins; it was the first time a 
political party coordinated criminal proceedings with congressional 
hearings to end a presidency.121 RIP has affected every subsequent 
presidency.122 For example, the Iran-Contra scandal, culminating in 
dramatic congressional hearings and eleven convictions, crippled 
President Reagan's final two years in office.123 The investigation of 
the Iran-Contra scandal lasted throughout George Bush's single term 
as president, and one of the last things he did as president was, con-
troversially, pardon two former Reagan officials, Casper Weinberger 
and Elliott Abrams, for their involvement in the affair. 124 Also, in 
1994, Newt Gingrich predicted that a Republican Congress would use 
its subpoena power to humble the Clinton administration.125 After 
Gingrich became House Speaker, Democrats triggered a House ethics 
inquiry culminating in fines against Gingrich for financial improprie-
ties.126 This was Democratic payback for Gingrich's use of similar tac-
tics to force the resignations of Democratic Speaker Jim Wright and 
House Whip Tony Coehlo in 1989.127 President Clinton had many of 
119. BENJAMIN GINSBERG & MARTIN SHEFTER, Pouncs BY OTHER MEANs: PounciANs, 
PROSECUTORS, AND THE PRESS FROM WATERGATE TO WHITEWATER 39 (rev. ed. 1999). 
120. /d. at 16. 
121. /d. at 39-40. 
122. For details on the rise and pervasiveness of RIP in relation to the presidency, see id. 
at 23-44. 
123. See id. at 144-48 (discussing the Iran-Contra affair and its effects on the Reagan 
presidency). 
124. See, e.g., Walter Pincus, Bush Pardons Weinbe7gCT in Iran-Contra Affair; 5 Others AL5o 
Cleared; Angry WaL5h Indicates a Focus on President, WASH. PosT, Dec. 25, 1992, at AI; David 
Johnston, The Pardons; Bush Pardons 6 in Iran Affair, Aborting a Weinbe7gCT Trial; Prosecutor 
AssaiL5 'Cover Up,' N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1992, at AI. 
125. See GINSBERG & SHEFTER, supra note 119, at 125 (noting Gingrich's plan to "launch 
legislative investigations to look into wrongdoing in the executive branch"). 
126. /d. at 28. 
127. /d. at 62. 
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his initiatives impeded or deflected because of over one hundred con-
gressional investigations128 (some ongoing and some repeatedly on 
the same subjects),129 court challenges by various partisan organiza-
tions, 130 and several independent counsel inquiries131 that fostered 
not only Clinton's impeachment, but also considerable media 
speculation. 
As an alternative method for controlling governmental conduct, 
RIP's costs have been enormous. First, it has consumed substantial 
government resources with little constructive outcome. Numerous 
congressional investigations into the Clinton administration have cost 
countless millions of dollars (the precise figures are unknown) and 
produced thousands of subpoenas (again, the precise numbers are 
unknown), but have yielded no improvements in our laws. 132 Politi-
cally driven investigations diminish the credibility of legitimate inquir-
ies. Moreover, in the waning days of the Clinton administration, 
House leaders deployed their subpoena power to investigate Clinton's 
internal deliberations in formulating policy, often before those delib-
erations were finished. The focus of the subpoenas was Clinton's uni-
128. See id. at 25 (explaining that "Republicans saw the never-ending investigative pro-
cess as a means of harassing Clinton and preventing him from pursuing any serious legisla-
tive agenda"); Paul A. Gigot, Scandal's Price: GOP Chaps up Bill's Agenda, WALL ST.j., May 1, 
1998, at A14 (contending that because of the so-called scandals, Clinton could not advance 
his agenda past Republicans in Congress); cf. Chris Black, A Rite of Non-Passage Comes to End 
for 105th Congress, BoSTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 1998, at A30 (noting a Democratic report that 
"found that 50 separate investigations of the Clinton administration were under way in the 
House alone"). 
129. Whitewater, to name but one example, was investigated on more than one occasion 
by different congressional committees. GINSBERG & SHEITER, supra note 119, at 42. 
130. The most obvious example is judicial Watch, a conservative group that has sued the 
President and his administration on several occasions. See, e.g., Lorraine Adams & David A. 
Vise, Report Clears First Lady and Others in FBI Files Case, WASH. PoST, Mar. 17, 2000, at A4 
(noting Judicial Watch's assistance in filing a civil lawsuit against Clinton over FBI files on 
Republicans allegedly obtained by the Clinton White House); John F. Harris, Clinton De-
fends Friend's Role in House Purchase, WASH. PosT, Oct. 1, 1999, at A19 (reporting that Judi-
cial Watch sued the Clintons for accepting an allegedly illegal gift in connection with their 
purchase of a home in NewYork);John F. Harris & Lorraine Adams, White House Is Probed 
onE-Mails; Justice Dept. opens Criminal Investigation, WASH. PoST, Mar. 24, 2000, at A1 (not-
ing the conservative group's involvement in a civil suit against the White House for alleg-
edly mishandling e-mail correspondence). 
131. See Louis Fisher, The Independent Counsel Statute, in THE CLINTON SCANDAL AND THE 
FuTURE oF AMERICAN GoVERNMENT 6!H)9, 75-76 (Mark]. Rozell & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2000) 
(discussing the Starr investigation and other independent counsel investigations of Clinton 
administration officials). 
132. The precise figures of investigations and subpoenas are unknown for two reasons. 
First, neither the White House nor any congressional organization publishes information 
on the numbers of subpoenas issued or on investigations of executive misconduct. Sec-
ond, the figures are difficult to compile, in part, because many investigations and many 
requests for data are informal. 
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lateral declaration of national monuments as a means to preseiVe 
certain federal land from being regulated. 133 Though Congress could 
have overridden the orders (because they were made pursuant to con-
gressional delegations that either could have been withdrawn or dis-
placed by law), 134 House leaders chose instead to impede 
administrative efficiency by forcing executive officials to squander 
time opposing the orders and to avoid maintaining written records of 
important meetings. 
Second, RIP has encouraged voter apathy. As RIP has risen, the 
percentage of people voting in presidential elections has declined, 
and in 1996, voter turnout reached its lowest level since 1924.135 
Third, RIP gets ratings. The proliferation of media outlets, in-
cluding the twenty-four-hour news cycle and the Internet, have pres-
sured news organizations to beat the competition by reporting 
unsupported gossip and speculating about possible misconduct.136 
Fourth, RIP impedes political compromise. Its rise coincides with 
an unprecedented increase in the percentage of party-line congres-
sional votes. Colleagues from opposing parties are unlikely to forget 
their personal contests in negotiating legislation. 
Lastly, RIP damages reputations recklessly. Too many lawmakers 
and prosecutors, such as Robert Ray in his Travelgate report, 137 insin-
uate wrongdoing when nothing criminal has transpired. They treat 
the reluctance to be investigated as suspect. Why, they ask, would an 
innocent person refuse to be investigated? Such suspicions take their 
toll by sometimes hardening into assumptions about guilt. 
Both the president and members of Congress have the means to 
limit these costs. First, the next president, who will oversee all federal 
prosecutions, can denounce RIP. He should take pains to ensure that 
prosecutions are based not on policy differences, but on credible and 
legitimate evidence of criminal wrongdoing. Second, the House 
should follow the Senate's (and its own pre-1995) practice of requir-
133. See George Lardner Jr., Subpoena Widens Finance Probe; Request for White House Papers 
Covers 25 Categories, Copy Shows, WASH. PosT, Aug. 15, 1997, at A4 (discussing the various 
reasons for the use of congressional subpoena power). 
134. The president was delegated the power to declare national monuments under 16 
u.s.c. § 431 (1994). 
135. See GINSBERG & SHEITER, supra note 119, at 18-22. 
136. I explore this problem further in Part IV. 
137. Though Ray decided not to bring criminal charges against President and Hillary 
Clinton for their involvement in the firings of several Travel Office employees, he sug-
gested there was "substantial evidence" of wrongdoing on Mrs. Clinton's part. Charles 
Babington, Cleared, With Questions; Ray Cites 'Substantial Evidence' First Lady Had Firings Role, 
WASH. PosT, June 23, 2000, at A18. 
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ing agreement between committee chairs and ranking minority mem-
bers prior to issuing legislative subpoenas. When House leaders in 
1995 empowered committee chairs, acting alone, to issue subpoenas, 
RIP flourished. Bipartisan agreement to investigate is essential to 
avoid abusive practices. 
RIP also thrives on poor electoral turnout. As long as voter turn-
out is low, politicians owe their elections to relatively small, intense 
constituencies. Despite long lines at some polls for the 2000 presiden-
tial election, the national turnout was barely fifty percent of the elec-
torate-the third-lowest in the past one-hundred years. 138 If core 
constituents are happy with RIP (and its associated costs), then 
elected leaders will likely maintain it. If, however, voter turnout in-
creases, those elected will be beholden to larger constituencies, many 
of whom despise government-by-subpoena. If people can signal that 
they want their presidents and Congress to prioritize legislating wisely 
over endless partisan investigations, RIP can be contained. Otherwise, 
the process will continue as an alternative to impeachment. 
IV. THE MEDIA AND THE CLINTON SCANDALS 
The Clinton impeachment proceedings highlighted a disturbing 
trend in the media's coverage of controversial political events. They 
showed the media's increasing penchant to substitute speculation and 
scandal reportage for coverage of actual facts and flgures. 139 A recent 
empirical study of the media's coverage of the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings revealed that a majority of the public thought that the 
media was biased in favor of the prosecution and that people "re-
sented the media for continuing to bring [stories of the scandal] to 
them."140 This resentment led much of the public to turn away from 
the media for guidance through the historic event of the President's 
138. On November 9, 2000, United Press Intemational reported that "[d]espite packed 
polling places in battleground states, experts say voter tumout nationally Tuesday was no 
higher than the lackluster levels of other recent presidential elections." Turnout Lackluster 
Again, Expms Say, UNITED PREss INT'L, Nov. 9, 2000. UPI explained that "[o]nly 50.7 per-
cent of eligible voters cast ballots, compared with 49 percent in 1996 when President Clin-
ton defeated Sen. Robert Dole and 50.1 percent in 1988 when then-Vice President George 
Bush beat Michael Dukakis." /d. 
139. See BILL KovAcH & ToM RosENSTIEL, WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AcE OF MIXED 
MEDIA 2 (1999) (explaining that in a "search to reclaim audience, the press has moved 
more toward sensationalism, entertainment, and opinion"); Jonathan Alter, Just the Facts?, 
WASH. MoNTHLY, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 22 (book review) (criticizing news reporters for al-
lowing opinions and snide assessments of motive to creep into what should be only factual 
news stories). 
140. KovAcH & RosENSTIEL, supra note 139, at 77. 
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impeachment. 141 This development is both good and bad. It is good 
in that it reflects a demise of the media's supposed ability to lead or 
shape public opinion; it flatly failed to do so in the Clinton impeach-
ment proceedings. Instead, the public demonstrated its ability to cut 
through the morass of commentary dumped on it to find the data that 
it wanted or needed. Yet, it is not a good development for the media 
to be abdicating or risking its traditional function of informing the 
public about important news events. 
The development of both the twenty-four-hour news cycle (pri-
marily on cable) and the Internet has pressured the media to change 
its traditional techniques for gathering and reporting news. The ex-
pansions of these technologies, in the judgment of Richard C. Leone, 
President of The Century Foundation, have transformed "both the 
time scale and the standards for what is news. Together, these devel-
opments have blurred the line between mainstream news and unsup-
ported gossip. They have made the sensational-however 
unsubstantiated-acceptable."142 
Consider the fact that even by the time the sensationalist Starr 
Report was released on the Internet for the world to read, the trans-
formation in news-gathering had already begun. Several important 
stories relating to Clinton's deceptiveness in his jones deposition, and 
later in his grand jury testimony, were initially made public on the 
Internet. For example, late in the evening of the day on which the 
President was deposed in the jones case, Matt Drudge, an infamous 
Internet gossip, beat the competition in reporting that the President 
had testified falsely in his deposition by denying a sexual relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky.143 The focus of Drudge's "Report" was News-
week's decision not to run a story about Clinton's relationship with 
Lewinsky.144 Drudge's sources, though unnamed at the time, were 
Lucianne Goldberg and George Conway, who had given him the in-
formation that they had unsuccessfully sought to have Newsweek pub-
lish.145 Drudge was also among the first to report (based again on 
information given to him by Goldberg) the existence of a semen-
stained dress belonging to Lewinsky that could, by means of DNA test-
ing, verify the existence of an illicit relationship between Lewinsky 
141. Id. at 77-78. As Kovach and Rosenstiel note, if the media continues to fragmentize 
and polarize viewers, "people will have less stake in using the media." Id. at 88. 
142. Richard C. Leone, Foreword to BILL KovAcH & ToM RosENSTIEL, WARP SPEED: 
AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED MEDIA, at V, vi (1999). 
143. KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 139, at 11-12. 
144. !d. For a reproduction of this report, see jEFFREY Too BIN, AVAST CoNSPIRACY: THE 
REAL STORY OF THE SEx SCANDAL THAT NEARLY BRoUGHT DoWN A PRESIDENT 231 (1999). 
145. TooBIN, supra note 144, at 229-30. 
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and Clinton.146 Although Drudge often reported sensational but ulti-
mately erroneous material, 147 his reporting earned him a regular spot 
among the talking heads on the MSNBC and Fox television networks. 
His reporting was reliable often enough that he could not be easily 
ignored by the mainstream media.148 The public could not turn its 
back on the Drudge Report either. One poll by the Pew Research 
Center for the People and the Press found that, more than ever, the 
public turned to Internet sites (such as Drudge's) as news sources dur-
ing the Clinton-Lewinsky saga. 149 
The twenty-four-hour news cycle and the Internet pose several 
challenges to the mainstream media that are likely to persist well be-
yond the presidency of Bill Clinton. First, they present the possibility 
of constant news updates with deadlines that are anything but fixed. 
Like a wire service, news can be published on the Web at a moment's 
notice; unlike a wire service, however, smaller Web sites have compar-
atively little editorial supervision. This raises the risk that the opera-
tors of the latter will proliferate unreliable and erroneous data. 
Second, the intensification of competition for reporting breaking 
news, brought about by the Internet, raises a serious question about 
whether the online version of a news story has the same standards of 
proof (or reliability) as the slower print version of the story. More 
than a few of the established elite media sources cut corners in order 
to compete with Drudge and others in reporting breaking news on 
the Clinton-Lewinsky drama. And more than a few established media 
sources were subsequently forced to retract stories or admit errors in 
their reports. 150 
146. See KovAcH & RosENSTIEL, supra note 139, at 139-41 (detailing the chronology of 
stories about the infamous blue dress). 
147. For instance, Drudge erroneously reported that evidence being gathered by the 
Independent Counsel would prove the existence of "hundreds" of other women, including 
White House staffers, with whom President Clinton had had inappropriate relationships. 
!d. at 29. 
148. It is even more striking that in spite of the fact that Drudge's accuracy rate was 
sufficiently low to get him fired by Fox television, many still consider him the hero of the 
hour in breaking the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal. 
149. The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Event Driven News Audiences, 
Internet News Takes Off, at www.people-press.org/med98rpt.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2000). 
150. I offer only two of the more prominent examples of this problem. First, the Wall 
Street journal posted on its Web site, before the paper had had a chance to verify the story, 
that a White House steward had told a federal grand jury that he had seen the President 
alone with Lewinsky (contradicting the President's testimony that he had never been 
"alone" with her). KovACH & RosENSTIEL, supra note 139, at 28. The next day the paper 
changed its report, clarifying that the steward had told Secret Service agents about an 
alleged encounter. !d. Ultimately, the Starr Report related no such testimony. Second, 
the Dallas Morning News reported on its Web site a story about an alleged Secret Service 
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Third, the Internet and the twenty-four-hour news cycle have 
pressured the media to increasingly substitute commentary or specula-
tion for factual reporting in the absence of breaking news. To be 
sure, the public has complained loudly and consistently that actual 
news reporting increasingly has been sacrificed for inconsequential 
commentary. Nevertheless, the Internet and the twenty-four-hour 
news cycle have underscored the economic efficiency and popularity 
of using talking heads (pundits) to fill dead air until breaking news 
actually occurs. It is cheaper for a network to find a few "experts" to 
talk-or, more precisely, to comment and speculate-about a subject 
than to produce more costly investigative reports. 151 Talking heads, 
in effect, have become cheap entertainment.152 
The inevitable question is what, if anything, can anyone, includ-
ing the next president, do about these problems? Regulation is, of 
course, out of the question because the First Amendment broadly pro-
tects the media's approach to reporting news.153 News organizations 
do, however, have the means to improve their own performances and 
restore the public's confidence in their professionalism. They need to 
declare publicly their respective standards and policies for gathering 
and reporting news. The public can then use these published stan-
dards and policies as bases for evaluating the media. Moreover, news 
organizations can monitor each other to determine how well or how 
poorly the competition is satisfYing its own standards of 
professionalism. 
witness to an intimate encounter between Clinton and Lewinsky. /d. The paper reported 
the story before it was verified by conventional means; it was trying to beat the competition 
on the Web, in print, and on the air. See id. As soon as the story had been released on the 
Web, its veracity began to be questioned in other mainstream media, including sources 
such as Nightline and Larry King Live. /d. Before the night was over, the main source for the 
story called the Morning News to retract its statement, and the paper had to publish a retrac-
tion during the next news cycle. /d. 
151. See generaUy id. at 59-76 (discussing the proliferation of punditry during the Lewin-
sky scandal). 
152. One dramatic post-impeachment example of this phenomenon was the around-
the-clock, nonstop discussion in the media after the plane crash of John F. Kennedy, Jr., 
even though it was several days before his death was actually confirmed and there was, in 
the interim, no additional "news" to report. 
153. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1983) 
("Unlike common carriers, broadcasters are 'entitled under the First Amendment to exer-
cise "the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their public duties."'" (quoting CBS, 
Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981), in turn quoting CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'! 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, llO (1973))). 
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v. THE SCANDALS IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
Over the past few decades, law professors have become increas-
ingly visible as public intellectuals. Throughout the Clinton impeach-
ment proceedings, law professors were especially visible as 
consultants, witnesses, commentators, advocates, and experts. Unfor-
tunately, much of their commentary on and advocacy in the proceed-
ings reflects a serious problem in legal academia. The dilemma is that 
there are no norms guiding or constraining legal academics' com-
mentary on public controversies. This is particularly the case outside 
of traditional fora such as law reviews. In the absence of such norms, 
many law professors allowed themselves to be used by the media in 
ways that helped to denigrate constitutional discourse. 154 
For example, many professors who assumed public roles during 
the Clinton impeachment proceedings operated not as dispassionate 
educators interested in clarifying basic legal and constitutional issues 
for the public (or their students), but rather as advocates. They were 
advocates for themselves (in the quest, presumably, to gain notoriety), 
their own pet theories of the proceedings, or one side of the 
controversy.155 
Also, many professors demonstrated a disturbing degree of certi-
tude about their points of view. The exception, rather than the rule, 
was any acknowledgment of self-doubt or uncertainty about the issues. 
Regrettably, few professors emulated the humility and candor of the 
late Joseph Goldstein, a beloved Yale Law School professor. One of 
the nation's leading family law scholars, Goldstein was not afraid, 
when confronted with a novel question of family law, to acknowledge 
that he was unsure of the answer and would have to give the matter 
some thought. 156 Almost no one commenting on the Clinton im-
peachment proceedings ever seemed to have doubts of any kind, even 
154. See PosNER, supra note 48, at 230-40 (arguing that the academic legal community 
lacks methods for resolving disputes that would be consensus building and would result in 
more objective discourse); Neal Devins, Bearing False Witness: The Clinton Impeachment and 
the Future of Academic Freedom, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 165, 165 (1999) (arguing that "[w]hen 
academics join forces to send a purely political message, their reputation as truth-seekers 
will diminish and, with it, their credibility"); Neal Devins & John McGinnis, Sign Them Up: 
They Rush to Join Legal Brieft, but Professors Often Don't Know What They're Talking About, LEGAL 
TIMES, July 24, 2000, at 62 (discussing the penchant of law professors and historians to 
publicly take positions on legal issues about which they have no expertise). 
155. A similar phenomenon regrettably arose, albeit more intensely, in the aftermath of 
the 2000 presidential election. More than a few professors who had never written on nor 
established themselves as experts on the electoral process for choosing presidents (or state 
election law) eagerly participated as pundits on network television. 
156. I base this on conversations with several of Professor Goldstein's former students. 
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though many issues (such as the constitutionality of censure) were 
novel and had never been carefully considered previously. 
In all likelihood, the certitude of many professors derives from 
another tendency of the profession-the tendency to gain stature or 
notoriety by putting forward dramatic, novel solutions. The more ex-
treme or unconventional the view, the more likely it will attract atten-
tion. Consequently, almost no one with a role in the proceedings 
appeared to be acting as a moderate; the academic viewpoints ex-
pressed tended to the extreme. Tentativeness became a weakness, 
and it certainly received little or no attention. 
A related problem is that many professors tended to formulate 
(and even modify) their extreme or dramatic opinions as the process 
unfolded. There is, of course, no problem with someone rethinking 
or changing his or her opinions. The problem was that professors 
sometimes expressed different opinions to different audiences. The 
result was that viewers or listeners were given different impressions 
depending on the timing or forum. Moreover, some scholars used 
the hearings as an opportunity to air previously unarticulated views on 
the Constitution only to revise, modify, or abandon those opinions 
later when no one was watching.157 
In addition, many legal scholars professed to be acting neutrally 
or without a political, personal, or partisan agenda even though they 
were acting at the request of the President, his friends or allies, House 
members, senators, interest groups, or the President's foes. Without 
any norms constraining or pressuring law professors to disclose their 
allegiances, it became much easier for them to hide their attachments, 
biases, or political agendas. More than a few law professors risked 
their credibility and the credibility of their profession by not being 
157. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this phenomenon was Yale law professor 
Bruce Ackerman's arguments regarding the legitimacy of lame duck impeachments. Ack-
erman first raised his argument that anything done by a lame duck Congress-including 
an impeachment-was unconstitutional just before his dramatic appearance before the 
House Judiciary Committee. See Bruce Ackerman, Lame Duck Impeachment? Not So Fast, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998, at A27. In the interim between the House's impeachment of Clinton 
and the initiation of Clinton's trial in the Senate, Ackerman released a book on the topic 
in which he modified his views to the point of suggesting that lame duck impeachments 
might be technically constitutional, but not good policy. BRUCE AcKERMAN, THE CAsE 
AGAINST UMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT 7-16 (1999). Ackerman's dramatic constitutional argu-
ments opposing lame duck impeachments were broadcast nationwide and covered by 
many prominent newspapers. See, e.g., Peter Baker, lW!ite House Lays Ground fur a Lame-Duck 
Defense, WASH. PosT, Dec. 9, 1998, at A20; David E. Rosenbaum, Testing of a President: The 
Issues; Come january, House Vote May Not Matter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1998, at A23; Kathy Kiely, 
Tart-Tounged Enmity Dominates Impeachment Hearing, USA ToDAY, Dec. 9, 1998, at 6A; 
Michael Tackett, Hardened Attitudes Resist Torrent of Wurds, CHI. TR!s., Dec. 9, 1998, at Nl. 
The revisions he made in his viewpoints, however, largely went unnoticed. 
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more forthcoming about their allegiances or preferences. In other 
words, law professors, at the very least, could have been (and should 
strive to be) much more candid publicly about their personal and po-
litical ties and about their professional limitations and credentials. 
The development of norms to guide or constrain the public com-
mentary (or activities, for that matter) of law professors is no mean 
feat. It will require professors to internalize standards of conduct. 
There are a number of practices that law faculties could adopt to culti-
vate such internalization, including faculty workshops on the appro-
priate standards for law professors' public commentary, or perhaps 
mini-symposia critiquing such public commentary. Faculties, as well 
as legal publications (including law reviews, the National Law journal, 
and Legal Times), could adopt shaming penalties for law professors 
whose public advocacy or argumentation (to the degree one can call it 
that) falls below respectable or acceptable standards. To the extent 
that law reviews or other publications have encouraged or rewarded 
ad hominem arguments or intemperate rhetoric, they should recon-
sider their own standards of publication and refuse to print argumen-
tation that lowers rather than enhances the quality of constitutional 
discourse. 158 
CONCLUSION 
I view the impending inauguration of the next president as a time 
to address several troubling ramifications of the Clinton impeachment 
proceedings. These include the increased use of congressional hear-
ings to harass political opponents; the media's increasing tendency to 
be more interested in scandal, speculation, and commentary than in 
the straight reporting of facts and figures; the exposure of impeach-
ment as a relatively antiquated, ineffective tool for addressing serious 
presidential misconduct; and law professors' proclivities to be advo-
cates rather than dispassionate educators. Nothing that has happened 
158. One dramatic example of this problem is the embarrassing exchanges between 
Chief judge Richard Posner and Ronald Dworkin over the proprieties of Posner's writing a 
book on the Clinton impeachment proceedings and Dworkin's review of the book in the 
Nw York Review of Books. See Neil A. Lewis, Watching 2 Legal Minds Square Off Ouer Clinton, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2000, at B9 (citing Dworkin's statement that it was "injudicious" for 
Posner "to make such a public parade of his own politics" and Posner's statement that 
Dworkin "goes overboard when he has a pen in his hand"); Steven Lubet, Ethics Clash of 
Two Giants, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 3, 2000, at A22 (reporting Dworkin's objection that Judge 
Posner exceeded the proper bounds of a federal judge by writing a book that comments on 
impending judicial proceedings). The ad hominem attacks between Posner and Dworkin 
in these pieces were unworthy of either of these distinguished scholars. One of the linger-
ing questions that their heated rhetoric raises is why scholars feel the need to vent so much 
of their personal conflict in public. 
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since the 2000 election gives me much confidence that any of these 
problems will be vanishing anytime soon. 
There are no easy answers to any of these problems, and it is un-
reasonable to expect the next president, whoever he is, to resolve 
these dilemmas. Yet, a few initial steps in the right direction seem 
feasible. What all of these steps have in common is the need for the 
leaders of several institutions to take responsibility for their actions. 
To begin with, the president can take the lead in denouncing the 
criminalization of policy differences and accept (rather than deflect) 
the responsibility for investigating and rooting out scandal within his 
administration. At the very least, members of Congress should re-
quire committee chairs and ranking minority members of committees 
to agree before initiating investigations or issuing legislative subpoe-
nas. Also, news organizations can be more open about their standards 
for publication or broadcast, and can make greater efforts to comply 
with those standards. And finally, those of us who teach law should be 
much more candid about our own allegiances, expertise, and 
agendas. 
It might be naive to think that even these small steps can make 
any difference. But I think it would be more naive to believe that 
without them the next four years will be much less scandal-ridden for 
any of us. 
